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MERITOR SA VINGS BANK v. VINSON: THE SUPREME
COURT'S RECOGNITION OF THE HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Sexual harassment in employment is a serious and widespread problem,
which is of concern to both employees and employers.' In broad terms, sexual
harassment is "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context
of a relationship of unequal power."2 It may involve the explicit conditioning
of tangible employment benefits upon acquiescence to a supervisor's sexual
demands.3 Alternatively, sexual harassment may, without tangible effect,
create an abusive work environment characterized by sexual innuendo, insults,
unwelcome advances, physical contact, and other offensive conduct.' Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits sex discrimination in
employment.5 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 6 the United States Supreme
Court considered for the first time whether, absent the explicit conditioning of
employment benefits upon sexual receptivity, sexual harassment falls within
that prohibition.7
In Meritor, the Court established that sexual harassment which creates a
hostile or abusive work environment is a violation of Title VII.t However, the
Court declined to issue a definitive rule on the liability of an employer for
"hostile environment" sexual harassment perpetrated by an employee.9 Noting
that the gravamen of a sexual harassment complaint is the unwelcome
character of the sexual conduct, the Court similarly avoided issuing a
definitive rule governing the evidence which an employer may introduce to
show that conduct was welcome.'"
'Brief for the United States and E.E.O.C. as amici curiae, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399
(1986) (available on LEXIS) (hereinafter cited as Brief of E.E.O.C.); C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1, 25 (1979) (hereinafter cited as C. MACKINNON);
McLain, The E.E.O.C Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Welcome Advances Under Title VII, 10 U. BALT.
L. REV. 275, 275-76 (1981). For a discussion of the sociological patterns of sexual harassment and its effect
upon women, see Brief of Working Women's Institute, et al. as amici curiae, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) (hereinafter cited as Brief of W.W.I.) (available on LEXIS).
'C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 1.
'C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 2.
'C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 2.
'Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701 etseq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e etseq. (1983). Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1983).
1106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986).
'Brief of Petitioner, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) (available on LEXts).
'Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405-06 (1986).
1Id. at 2408.
'Ild. at 2406-07.
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This casenote will examine Meritor in light of the brief legal history of Ti-
tle VII sexual harassment claims and will consider the implications of both the
Court's holding and its dicta regarding the undecided issues.
HISTORY
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits sex
discrimination in employment," courts have recognized only recently that sex-
ual harassment is a discriminatory practice actionable under Title VII. Many
cases were dismissed at least partly because the courts viewed supervisors' sex-
ual demands upon subordinates as personal rather than employment related.2
Employers have argued, and courts have held, that firing a female employee
for refusing to submit to sexual demands did not constitute a Title VII viola-
tion because the class discriminated against was defined by willingness to per-
form sexual favors, rather than by gender. The courts' reluctance to uphold
Title VII sexual harassment claims may stem partly from Congress' failure to
define "discrimination" in Title VIP 4 and partly from well-established and
widespread views on women's sexuality. 5
As courts began to view sexual harassment as stating a claim under Title
VII, the courts restricted findings of discrimination to cases in which the plain-
tiff could show a tangible loss as a consequence of the harassment. Now,
however, federal courts recognize two distinct forms of sexual harassment:
"harassment that creates an offensive environment ('condition of work') and
harassment in which a supervisor demands sexual consideration in exchange
for [tangiblel job benefits ('quid pro quo')."' 7
"142 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1983).
"See, e.g., Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C 1974), rev'd, Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975); Miller v. Bank of
America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd., 600 F.2d 211 (1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally C. MACKINNON,
supra note 1, at 59-60, 83-92.
"Barnes, 561 F.2d at 986; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Tomkins, 568 F.2d at
1047; Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654,658 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'don other grounds, Williams v. Bell, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
"General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
"C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 7.
"See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989-90 n.49.
The first instance in which a hostile environment was found to constitute sex discrimination was a 1976
unemployment appeal. C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 77. Although other plaintiffs attempted to ground
sex discrimination complaints on a hostile environment theory, see, e.g., Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1046 n.1
(finding tangible detriment, the court declined to rule on the environmental question), no federal court
adopted this position until 1980, when an Oklahoma district court stated that a discriminatory environment
"created an 'impermissible condition of employment.'" Note, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L. REV. 535, 555 (1981)
(citing Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 162 (W.D. Okla. 1980)). However, in Brown, the
employee had resigned because of the work environment. Id. See also Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451
F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942.
"Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n. 18 (11 th Cir. 1982). See generally C. MACKINNON, supra
note 1, at 32-40 (quid pro quo), 40-47 (condition of work).
[Vol. 20:3
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Bundy v. Jackson was the first sexual harassment case in which a plaintiff
who had remained employed succeeded in federal court on a hostile environ-
ment theory. 8 Consistent with extensive case law involving racial discrimina-
tion, 9 the Bundy court held that Title VII's reference to "conditions of employ-
ment" includes the work environment, and that "sexual harassment, which in-
jects the most demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environ-
ment and which always represents an intentional assault on an individual's in-
nermost privacy" is illegal.2 0 The court noted that to deny recovery in hostile
environment cases would permit employers to "sexually harass a female
employee with impunity by carefully stopping short of ... taking any... tangi-
ble actions against her in response to her resistance ...."I'
The federal appellate courts, which have since decided cases involving
hostile environment claims, have consistently followed Bundy."2 Accordingly,
courts have approved employers' termination of male supervisors whose sexual
behavior created an offensive work environment. 3 Most courts have required
a showing of five elements to state a sexual harassment claim. The necessary
elements are (1) that the employee belonged to a protected group; (2) that the
employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harass-
ment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment affected a "term, condition or
privilege of employment"; and (5) that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment, and failed to take prompt remedial action. 4 In the
absence of a tangible job detriment, courts have required a stronger showing
that the sexually harassing conduct was pervasive and created an abusive
working environment. 5
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
In 1974, Mechelle Vinson met Sidney Taylor, a branch manager and
assistant vice president for Meritor Savings Bank. 6 Taylor gave Vinson an
employment application and later informed her of the bank's decision to hire
her. 7 During the next four years, under Taylor's supervision, Vinson rose from
teller-trainee to assistant branch manager. Her advancement was based solely
sSee Significant Development, supra note 16, at 555; Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-44.
9Id. at 944-45.
2Id.
21d.
'See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir.
1983); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
2"See Snipes v. United States Postal Serv., 677 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1981); Whitaker v. Carney, 778 F.2d 216
(5th Cit. 1985).
"Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05; Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (1986).
2"Id. at 720.
"Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2402.
vId.
2id.
Winter, 19871
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on merit.29 On September 21, 1978, Vinson notified Taylor that she would be
on sick leave indefinitely."s The following day, Vinson filed suit against Taylor
and the bank, alleging that Taylor had subjected her to sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII. sl On November 1, 1978, the bank terminated Vinson.32
Vinson asserted that Taylor had conditioned her employment on the per-
formance of sexual favors." Vinson testified that in May, 1975, Taylor began
making various sexual demands on her, and that she had complied for fear of
losing her job. ' Vinson additionally alleged that Taylor had assaulted and
raped her, and that one rape had required medical attention.35 According to
Vinson's testimony, the sexual incidents ceased when she began seeing a
steady boyfriend in 1977.36
Vinson never reported Taylor's conduct to any of his supervisors.3 7
Although the bank had an internal grievance procedure, Vinson stated that
she never attempted to use the procedure because she feared reprisals from
Taylor.3" She contended that because Taylor was a branch manager and vice
president, his knowledge of the alleged harassment constituted notice to the
bank. 9 Vinson did not file a charge with the E.E.O.C. until after she had in-
stituted the lawsuit.4
Taylor denied Vinson's allegations, asserting that he had neither asked for
nor engaged in sexual activities with Vinson." He testified that Vinson had
made sexual advances toward him, and that he had declined.42 Taylor stated
that Vinson's charges stemmed from her desire to retaliate as a result of a
business dispute. 3
The bank also denied Vinson's allegations, and argued that even if Taylor
had made advances toward Vinson, Taylor's activities were unknown to the
29Id.
'OId.; Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986)
(available on LEXIS).
I'Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2402.
3id.
"Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1980), revd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
reh 'g en banc denied, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399
(1986).
34Id.
35Id.
3Id.
"Id. at 39.
3SId.
3"Id. at 41. Although Vinson contended that third parties had notified Taylor's supervisors at the bank of the
alleged harassment, the trial court found that the bank had not received notice of sexual harassment.
4"Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 144 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
41 Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 39.
42Id.
3Id.
[Vol. 20:3
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bank, and were not carried out with the bank's approval."
The district court admitted "voluminous testimony" concerning Vinson's
dress and sexual fantasies.45 Vinson testified that Taylor had made sexual ad-
vances to other female employees at the bank, and she attempted to call other
witnesses to support this claim." Although the court admitted some of this
testimony, the district court refused to allow Vinson "to present wholesale
evidence of a pattern and practice" of harassment at the bank."7
The district court decided the case prior to the Bundy decision. The court
found that Vinson's employment and status were not conditioned on her
granting Taylor sexual favors; that any sexual relationship between Vinson
and Taylor was voluntary; that the bank had an express policy of non-
discrimination and a grievance procedure of which Vinson had failed to take
advantage; and that Vinson was not the victim of sexual harassment or sex
discrimination." The court further found that the bank had not received notice
of the alleged misconduct, and that therefore the bank could not be liable. 9
Almost five years later, and after rendering its decision in Bundy, the ap-
pellate court reversed. 0 Finding that the district court had failed to determine
whether a "hostile environment" violation of Title VII had occurred, the court
of appeals remanded."
"Id.
"'Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36.
'Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 38.
71d. at 38-39 n.1.
"The District Court found:
4. Plaintiff was not required to grant Taylor or any other member of [the bank] sexual favors as a
condition of either her employment or in order to obtain promotion.
5. If the plaintiff and Taylor did engage in an intimate sexual relationship during the time of plain-
tiff's employment with [the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one by plaintiff having
nothing to do with her continued employment at [the bank] or her advancement or promotions at
that institution. (footnote omitted)
9. All raises, bonuses and promotions were determined by officials at the [bank], not Mr. Taylor,
who only made written recommendations.
12. The alleged sexual harassment involving Mechelle Vinson was not reported by her or by anyone
on her behalf to the police or to any officials at the [bank].
13. The [bankl's Employee Manual provides a grievance procedure whereby any employee may state
a grievance and have it resolved, if not by a supervisor, then by the division head or the president.
14. Mechelle Vinson never filed an informal or formal grievance against defendant, Sidney L.
Taylor, pursuant to the [bank]'s Employee Manual.
15. The express policy of the defendant [bank] is one of nondiscrimination in employment practices.
21. Plaintiff was not the victim of sexual harassment and was not the victim of sexual discrimination
while employed at Ithe bank) during the period September 9, 1974 through November 1978.
Id. at 42-43.
"Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 42.
"'Vinson, 753 F.2d at 141.
51Id. at 145. The appellate court viewed the district court's finding that Vinson "was not the victim of sexual
harassment and was not the victim of sexual discrimination while employed at [the bank]..." as susceptible
to several interpretations. Id. at 145 n.32. The district court could have meant that Vinson was not victim-
ized in the legal sense, either because she failed to qualify under the quid pro quo standard, or because the
court found her relationship with Taylor to have been voluntary. Id. Alternatively, the lower court could
have intended this finding as "the ultimate resolution of the conflicting evidence on Taylor's behavior
toward Vinson." Id. Noting that "[a] finding of fact must, at minimum, furnish enough detail to disclose the
Winter, 1987]
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The appellate court stated that evidence regarding Vinson's dress and per-
sonal fantasies was irrelevant and should not have been admitted.52 Surmising
that that evidence had been material to the district court's finding of "volun-
tariness," the court stated that a victim's "voluntary" submission to unlawful
discrimination had no bearing on whether toleration of an abusive environ-
ment had been made a condition of her employment. 3 The court of appeals
held that the district court had erred in excluding evidence concerning Taylor's
harassment of other female employees." Under Bundy, such evidence was
directly relevant to the hostile environment question."
Finally, the appellate court held that an employer is strictly liable for the
sexual harassment of any employee by a "supervising superior. '56 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the E.E.O.C.'s Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, which propose vicarious liability even when the
employer is without notice of discriminatory conduct.57 The appellate court's
holding was consistent with case law involving racial and religious discrimina-
tion.58
The court of appeals did not limit its holding to supervisory employees
with the authority to hire and fire. 9 The court noted that the mere appearance
of influence in vital employment decisions creates an opportunity for the
supervisor to "coerce, intimidate and harass" employees.6 A supervisor lacking
the authority to hire and fire may still direct employees in their work, and pro-
vide evaluations and recommendations to those possessing that authority.1
The court believed its ruling would provide employers with incentive to active-
ly protect employees from discriminatory work environments.62
It is not clear why the Supreme Court selected Meritor for its first con-
steps by which the court arrived at its conclusion ... ," the appellate court stated that the district court's find-
ing indicated neither the underlying facts on which that court had relied, nor the statutory standards which
the court had applied. Id.
Id at 146.
531d.
541d.
55Id.
"6d. at 147, 150.
"Id. at 148-50.
The Guidelines provide:
(c) Applying general Title VII principles, an employer ... is responsible for its acts and those of its
agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence. ...
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c) (1985).
"Vinson, 753 F.2d at 149.
"Id. at 149-50.
"Id. at 150.
6 1Id.
11d. at 151.
[Vol. 20:3
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sideration of sexual harassment. The district court failed to explain the ra-
tionale behind its findings or clarify its factual determinations.63 Neither the
court of appeals nor the Supreme Court received a complete trial transcript."
There were no factual findings on whether Vinson and Taylor engaged in any
sexual activity, whether any sexual conduct which occurred was unwelcome,
or whether the workplace was characterized by pervasive sexual harassment.65
The absence of factual findings regarding the harassment limited the Supreme
Court to a purely hypothetical consideration of the liability question. 6
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that unwel-
come sexual advances which create an offensive working environment violate
Title VII 7 The Court rejected the bank's argument that the reference in Title
VII to the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment was
limited to tangible economic factors.68 The Court noted that the language of
Title VII "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of dis-
parate treatment of men and women' in employment."6 The E.E.O.C. Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of Sex70 define sexual harassment and specify
that Title VII prohibits sexual harassment.7 The Court noted that, although
not controlling, the Guidelines are consistent with both judicial decisions and
E.E.O.C. precedent establishing that Title VII prohibits employers from main-
taining offensive or intimidating work environments. 2 The Court agreed with
earlier decisions that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment" includes the "state of psychological well-being at the workplace.""
The Supreme Court noted that not all harassment constitutes a Title VII
violation.7 To fall within the Title VII prohibition, the harassment must be
3See supra note 51.
6"Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2402.
"Id. at 2408.
"Id.
"Id. at 2404.
63id.
"Id.
729 C.F.R. § 1604.11. § 1604.1 ](a) (1985) provides:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or con-
dition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
"Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2405.
72d.
"Id. at 2405-06. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 901.
"Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2406.
Winter, 1987]
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"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of... employment and
create an abusive working environment."'' 5 Because Vinson's allegations in-
cluded not only pervasive harassment, but also forcible rape, the Court found
that in this case, the harassment was actionable.76
Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on the degree of pervasiveness
required to state a claim. Other courts have held that "isolated incidents,"
"mere flirtation[s],"77 and the "mere utterance of epithets"78 will not support a
finding of harassment. The conduct complained of must "illegally poison the
atmosphere ... from the viewpoint of the reasonable victim."79
One court found a supervisor's occasional advances, coupled with the
employer's use of bare-breasted female figurines as table decorations at an of-
fice party, insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment. 0 Purporting
to apply Meritor, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an environ-
ment characterized by a supervisor's repeated sexual propositions and requests
for sexual favors in exchange for advice and assistance was not sufficiently per-
vasive to be actionable under Title VII.8' The court noted that the employee
had considered the supervisor to be her friend. 2 Additionally, the supervisor
had willingly advised and assisted the employee despite her refusal to comply
with his sexual requests. 3
In Bundy, it was "standard operating procedure" for supervisors to solicit
sexual favors from female employees." The plaintiff's supervisor repeatedly
asked her to engage in sex with him, and often questioned her about her sexual
proclivities. 5 When she complained to his superior, she was told that "any man
in his right mind would want to rape you."86
In Henson, the plaintiff's supervisor subjected her to "numerous
harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities" over a two-year
period. 7 He requested sexual favors,88 used "crude and vulgar language," and
751d.
76Id.
"Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo. 1978). See also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
'Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
"E.E.O.C. Brief, Meritor, (citing Katz and Henson).
'Jones, 793 F.2d at 716, 721.
"Scatt v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 85-1722, slip op., (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 1986), afj'g 605 F. Supp. 1047
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (available on LEXIS).
2 Id.
83]d.
"Bundy, 641 F.2d at 939.
"Id. at 940.
"Id.
7Henson. 682 F.2d at 899.
Uid.
[Vol. 20:3
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made daily inquiries about her sexual habits.89 The court held that the
employee's allegations were sufficient to make out a Title VII claim. 90
In Katz, the plaintiff alleged that her workplace was "pervaded with sex-
ual slur, insult and innuendo."'" Both her supervisor and fellow workers used
sexual epithets when speaking to her or about her.92 The words used were
"widely recognized as intensely degrading," vulgar in meaning, and phonetical-
ly expressive of "disgust and violence." 93 When the employee complained to a
superior, he responded with a sexual invitation. 9 The court found this harass-
ment to constitute a hostile environment.95
THE "WELCOME" DEFENSE
To be actionable under Title VII, sexual harassment must be not only
severe, but also unwelcome." In Meritor, the Supreme Court distinguished be-
tween "voluntary" and "welcome" sexual conduct.97 A claimant's "voluntary"
participation in, as opposed to forced submission to, sexual activity is not a
defense to a sexual harassment claim under Title VII.91 The proper inquiry is
whether, by her conduct, the claimant indicated that the sexual advances were
unwelcome - not whether her participation was "voluntary." 99 The Court
agreed with the appellate court's affirmance of the Bundy holding that an
employee could establish a sexual harassment claim without a showing that
she resisted her employer's sexual overtures.'00
However, the Court did not accept the appellate court's ruling that
testimony concerning Vinson's dress and fantasies "had no place in this litiga-
tion." 1 Instead, the Court found evidence of Vinson's sexually provocative
speech or dress to be "obviously relevant" to the question of whether she found
particular sexual advances unwelcome.' 2 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
referred to the E.E.O.C. Guidelines, 0 which "emphasize that the trier of fact
ld. at 900-01.
"Id. at 905.
"Katz, 709 F.2d at 254.
92Id.
"9Id.
%1d.
"Id. at 256.
"Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2406.
"Id.
"J'L
"Id
"*Id.; Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146. See Bundy. 641 F.2d at 946. See also C. MAcKiNNON,supra note 1, at 164.
"'Vinson. 753 F.2d at 146; Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2407.
102 d.
"'29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. § 1604.1 1(b) provides:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at
the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual ad-
RECENT CASESWinter, 19871
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must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of 'the record as a
whole' and 'the totality of [sic] circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.""' Whether
the potential for unfair prejudice outweighs the relevance of the evidence is a
question for the district court to determine."5
In its brief with the United States as amici curiae," the E.E.O.C. stated
that evidence that the plaintiffs "sexually suggestive conduct" contributed to
the objectionable environment is relevant to the question of whether alleged
sexual advances were unwelcome."'0 7 Henson offers further support for the
Supreme Court ruling. In that case, the court stated that unwelcome sexual
conduct is that which the employee "did not solicit or incite," and which the
employee regarded as "undesirable or offensive."108 Thus, any evidence sug-
gesting that the employee solicited or incited the sexual advances might be
seen as relevant.
Vinson argued strongly in favor of the appellate court's ruling that the
evidence be excluded. In her brief, she equated the trial court's finding of con-
sent with "an atavism from the law of rape that 'a rape accusation ... [is] the
product of a woman's over-active fantasy life or ... [the] consequence of a
woman's communication of her sexual desires, subtly or otherwise, to a hapless
male."''' 19 Pointing to the analogy between sexual harassment and rape, Vin-
son asserted that under present rape law, only evidence of previous consensual
sex with the defendant would generally be held to be admissible." 0 Evidence of
prior unchastity or sexual relations with others is generally considered more
prejudicial than probative."'
In Priest v. Rotary,"2 the defendant in a sexual harassment case attempt-
ed to discover evidence regarding the plaintiffs past sexual history, to support
vances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a
particular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
"Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2407.
105 Id
1'"The United States and E.E.O.C. argued that the appellate court's decision should be reversed, primarily on
the ground that the district court's finding of a voluntary relationship between Vinson and Taylor was not
clearly erroneous. E.E.O.C. Brief, Meritor.
"'E.E.O.C. Brief.
IUHenson, 682 F.2d at 903.
IaBrief of Respondent, Meritor.
'
101d.
"Id. See generally Annot., Admissibility in Rape Case, Under Rule 412 of Federal Rules of Evidence, of
Evidence of Victim's Past Sexual Behavior, 65 A.L.R. FED. 519 (1983); Annot., Modern Status of Ad-
missibility, in Forcible Rape Prosecution, of Complainant's General Reputation for Unchastity, 95 A.L.R.
3d 1181 (1979 & Supp. 1986); Annot., Modern Status of Admissibility, in Forcible Rape Prosecution, of
Complainant's Prior SexualActs, 94 A.L.R. 3d 257 (1979 & Supp. 1986); Annot., Admissibility of Evidence
of Character or Reputation of Party in Civil Actionfor Sexual Assault on Issues Other than Impeachment,
100 A.L.R. 3d 569 (1980).
1173 A.L.R. FED. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
(Vol. 20:3
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss3/11
his claim that the plaintiff had been the sexual aggressor in their relationship."'
The court noted the similarity of position between a sexual harassment plain-
tiff and a rape victim."' In granting the plaintiffs motion for a protective
order, the court stated:
Sexual harassment plaintiffs would appear to require particular protection
from this sort of intimidation and discouragement if the statutory cause of
action for such claims is to have meaning. Without such protection from
the courts, employees whose intimate lives are unjustifiably and offensive-
ly intruded upon in the workplace might face the "Catch-22" of invoking
their statutory remedy only at the risk of enduring further intrusions into
irrelevant details of their personal lives in discovery, and, presumably, in
open court."5
Meritor contended that evidence concerning Vinson's sexually oriented
conversations at the bank was admissible."6 None of the conversations in-
volved Taylor, but instead concerned medical experiences, fantasies about
Vinson's grandfather, and another employee's sexual interest in Vinson."7
There was no evidence that Taylor was aware of these conversations during
Vinson's tenure at the bank."' Meritor additionally sought to introduce
testimony that Vinson's revealing clothing provoked customer comments at
the bank." 9 Vinson asserted that the sole purpose of this evidence was "to pro-
vide a pornographic image" of her. 20 Vinson argued that this type of character
evidence was inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2'
Evidence of Vinson's dress at her place of employment should have no
bearing on whether Taylor's alleged advances were welcome. For women, "at-
tractiveness" can have economic consequences: offers of employment and pro-
motions may in many instances turn on the woman's appearance.' Many
women have been led to believe that success in their careers depends on an ap-
pearance of sexual receptivity.'23 Thus, Vinson's allegedly provocative attire
could have reflected a desire to further her career rather than a sexual interest
in Taylor. Either view is speculative at best. Just as employment decisions
11id. at 738-39.
"'Id. at 746-47.
"'Id. at 746.
"'Brief of Respondent, Meritor, Brief of Petitioner, Meritor.
171d
"'Brief of Respondent, Meritor.
"'Brief of Petitioner, Meritor.
'"Brief of Respondent, Meritor.
12id. Vinson additionally asserted that the fact that she is Black played a role in her being "victimized by the
invidious stereotype of being [a] scandalous and lewd Iwoman]...," thereby undermining her credibility. Id.
See generally C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 53-54. See also Brief of W.W.I., Meritor.
"TC. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 20-23.
123[d.
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"cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the
characteristics of males and females," 2" a supervisor's decision to repeatedly
make sexual advances toward a female subordinate cannot be predicated on an
impression derived from the clothing she wears to work.
It is not clear why the Supreme Court chose to review the admissibility of
this evidence. There was other evidence more responsive to the question of
whether Taylor's alleged advances were "welcome." Vinson declined a job
transfer during the period of the alleged harassment. 25 It was undisputed that
the alleged harassment ended after a change in Vinson's personal cir-
cumstances - her involvement with a steady boyfriend'26 - not as the result
of an event within Taylor's sphere of influence. The Supreme Court did not
consider whether testimony regarding Taylor's alleged advances toward other
employees, which the district court had excluded, should be admitted upon re-
mand. 7 That Taylor allegedly engaged in similar conduct with Vinson's co-
workers would support the view that Vinson did not "solicit or incite" his ad-
vances. Further, insofar as Vinson's claim included allegations of forcible rape,
the question of whether Taylor's alleged impositions were "welcome" would
appear to be moot. Most likely, the Court's primary intent was to strike down
the appellate court's ruling that evidence of a claimant's dress or sexually
oriented conversations is per se inadmissible.
LIABILITY
The issue of liability posed an interesting dilemma for the Supreme Court.
Title VII does not directly address the question of whether an employer is
strictly liable for a sexually discriminatory work environment created or con-
doned by supervisory personnel.'28 In both quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment cases involving racial and religious discrimination, both the courts and
the E.E.O.C. have held employers strictly liable.2 9 In quidpro quo cases of sex-
ual harassment, courts have found employers strictly liable, while in hostile en-
vironment cases, courts have required actual or constructive knowledge. 3' In
Vinson, the appellate court extended vicarious liability to hostile environment
sexual harassment.' The appellate court's holding was largely based on the
"'City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
"'Brief of Petitioner, Meritor, Brief of E.E.O.C., Meritor.
106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986), available on Lexis.
216 Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 38.
"'Unlike the question concerning Vinson's dress and conversations, this issue was not raised in the briefs of
the parties.
1n42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1983).
'"Vinson 753 F.2d at 149 n.67.
132See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 909-10; Miller, 600 F.2d at 213; Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599,
604-06 (7th Cir. 1985); Jones, 793 F.2d at 720. See generally McLain, supra note 1, at 317-22; Note,
Employment Discrimination - Defining an Employer's Liability Under Title VII for On-the-Job Sexual
Harassment: Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C.L. REV. 795, 803-11 (1984).
3 Vinson, 753 F.2d at 148-50. See also Significant Development, supra note 16, at 538.
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E.E.O.C. Guidelines, which provide:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer ... is responsible for
its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to
sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of
were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence.
The Commission will examine the circumstances of the particular em-
ployment relationship and the job Iflunctions performed by the individual
in determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agen-
cy capacity (emphasis added).'32
However, the E.E.O.C. asserted in its amicus brief that the appellate
court's theory of strict liability was "erroneous as a matter of statutory con-
struction."'33 Pointing to Title VII's definition of employer as including "any
agent of such a person,"'3 the E.E.O.C. stated that an employer's liability for
its employees' acts should be determined in light of traditional agency prin-
ciples.'35 A principal is liable for only those acts within the scope of the agent's
employment representing the exercise of actual or apparent authority vested in
the agent.'36 The E.E.O.C. argued that in hostile environment sexual harass-
ment cases, the supervisor is not exercising, or threatening to exercise, actual
or apparent authority to make personnel decisions affecting the victim.'37 By
interjecting agency principles into the apparently unambiguous language of
the Guidelines, the E.E.O.C. concluded that in sexual harassment claims based
on a hostile environment theory, the usual grounds for imputing the super-
visor's actions to the employer may not exist.' The E.E.O.C. asserted that
because the supervisor is not exercising the authority vested in him by the
employer, employer liability should be predicated on actual or constructive
knowledge of the offensive atmosphere.'39
Thus, with the appellate court's holding, the Supreme Court faced a
precedent which was both in harmony and in conflict with existing case law.
l4
Title VII is ambiguous.' 4' The argument presented by the E.E.O.C. con-
troverted the clear language of that commission's own guidelines. 142 Further,
.3229 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c) (1985).
"'Brief of E.E.O.C., Meritor.
1'Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1983).
"'Brief of E.E.O.C., Meritor.
6Id.
"'Id. But see Note, Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1449, 1461 (1984); Henson, 682 F.2d at 913 (Clark, J. concurring).
ImBrief of E.E.O.C., Meritor.
139Id
"
"'ISee supra note 130.
"See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
"'29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985); Brief of E.E.O.C., Meritor.
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the case before the Court was essentially hypothetical. The Court did not
know whether Taylor had made any sexual advances towards Vinson, much
less "whether those advances were unwelcome, whether they were sufficiently
pervasive to constitute a condition of employment, or whether they were 'so
pervasive and so long continuing.., that the employer must have become con-
scious of [them]' . "143
It is therefore not surprising that the Court declined to issue a definitive
rule on employer liability.14 Agreeing with the E.E.O.C.'s proposal that deci-
sions regarding employer liability be guided by agency principles, the Court
held that employers are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment
by their supervisors. 4 1 However, in a concurring opinion, Justices Marshall,
Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens rejected the E.E.O.C.'s position and stated
that when a supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee under his supervi-
sion creates a discriminatory work environment, the harassment should be im-
puted to the employer for Title VII purposes.'
Noting that the E.E.O.C.'s position on liability as expressed in its amicus
brief appeared inconsistent with the Guidelines, the Court quoted the commis-
sion's brief with apparent approval. 14' According to the E.E.O.C., the court
should base any determination of employer liability on whether the employer
has an express policy against sexual harassment and a procedure "specifically
designed to resolve sexual harassment claims."'' 4 The E.E.O.C. asserted that
any employer with such a policy and procedure in place should be immune
from liability for hostile environment sexual harassment if the victim fails to
invoke the procedure and the employer lacks actual knowledge of the harass-
ment. 1
9
The Court rejected Meritor's view that the existence of a general non-
discrimination policy and an employee grievance procedure should insulate an
employer from liability if the employee fails to invoke the grievance
procedure."" In accord with the E.E.O.C. position, the Court suggested that a
policy which fails to explicitly address sexual harassment, and procedures not
calculated to encourage sexually harassed employees to complain, may be in-
sufficient to protect an employer from liability.''
"'Id; see supra note 66.
'"Meritor. 106 S.Ct. at 2408.
145 Id.
"Id. at 2411 (Marshall, J. concurring).
"'Id. at 2408.
'"Id.
"'Id; Brief of E.E.O.C., Meritor.
'"Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2408-09.
15'Id.
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CONCLUSION
In Meritor, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim is actionable under Title VII.52 Although the
Court held that to constitute a Title VII violation, the harassment must be per-
vasive, 3' the Court failed to elaborate on the degree of pervasiveness necessary
to state a claim. As appellate courts had already begun to recognize hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment claims as actionable, 5 the Supreme Court's
holding does not represent a major change in employment discrimination law.
Although the Supreme Court's decision considerably diminishes the force
of the E.E.O.C. Guidelines with respect to employer liability, the Court's
holding may serve to further the goals of Title VII' 55 The ultimate goal of Title
VII is to eliminate discriminatory employment practices. 56 The preferred
methods of promoting that goal are cooperation and voluntary compliance.'57
By suggesting that an employer may avoid liability by implementing a policy
and procedure directed specifically at the elimination of sexual harassment and
designed to encourage employee complaints, the Court has created incentive
for employers to voluntarily comply with Title VII.
In one case involving a supervisor who sexually harassed female subor-
dinates, the employer's prompt investigation of the employees' complaints
culminated in the discharge of the supervisor. Apparently, as a result of the
employer's prompt remedial action, none of the employees filed formal com-
plaints.' By providing employees with an opportunity to voice their com-
plaints, free from fear of reprisals, employers may possibly avoid liability for
sexual harassment, not through a shield of procedural safeguards, but by
eliminating the need for employees to resort to the courts.
VICTORIA T. BARTELS
'11d. at 2405-06.
"lid. at 2406.
"'See supra notes 18-23.
I'Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2408-09.
"6Jones, 793 F.2d at 726.
15 t Id.
I Whitaker. 778 F.2d at 218.
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